A new graphical password scheme resistant to shoulder-surfing by Haichang, Gao et al.
A New Graphical Password Scheme Resistant to Shoulder-Surfing 
 
Haichang Gao, Zhongjie Ren, Xiuling Chang, 
Xiyang Liu 
Software Engineering Institute 
Xidian University 
Xi’an, Shaanxi 710071, P.R.China 
hchgao@xidian.edu.cn 
Uwe Aickelin 
School of Computer Science 
The University of Nottingham 
Nottingham, NG8 1BB, U.K. 
uxa@cs.nott.ac.uk
 
 
Abstract—Shoulder-surfing is a known risk where an attacker 
can capture a password by direct observation or by recording 
the authentication session. Due to the visual interface, this 
problem has become exacerbated in graphical passwords. 
There have been some graphical schemes resistant or immune 
to shoulder-surfing, but they have significant usability 
drawbacks, usually in the time and effort to log in. In this 
paper, we propose and evaluate a new shoulder-surfing 
resistant scheme which has a desirable usability for PDAs. Our 
inspiration comes from the drawing input method in DAS and 
the association mnemonics in Story for sequence retrieval. The 
new scheme requires users to draw a curve across their 
password images orderly rather than click directly on them. 
The drawing input trick along with the complementary 
measures, such as erasing the drawing trace, displaying 
degraded images, and starting and ending with randomly 
designated images provide a good resistance to shoulder-
surfing. A preliminary user study showed that users were able 
to enter their passwords accurately and to remember them 
over time.  
Keywords-graphical password; shoulder-surfing; PDA; 
authentication 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Graphical passwords have been proposed as a useful 
authentication method for Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) 
which are increasingly used with their small size, compact 
deployment and low cost [1]. Given the fact that pictures are 
generally easier to remember than words [2, 3] and that 
humans are the ‘weakest link’ in any password 
authentication mechanism [4-6], it is conceivable that 
graphical passwords would be able to provide a good trade-
off between usability and security. 
However, most of the current graphical password 
schemes are vulnerable to shoulder-surfing [7-10], a known 
risk where an attacker can capture a password by direct 
observation or by recording the authentication session. Due 
to the visual interface, shoulder-surfing becomes an 
exacerbated problem in graphical passwords. Several 
approaches have been developed to deal with this problem, 
but they have significant usability drawbacks, usually in the 
time and effort to log in, making them less suitable for 
everyday authentication [11-13]. For example, it is time-
consuming for users to log in CHC [11] and there are 
complex text memory requirements in scheme proposed by 
Hong [19]. With respect to the scheme proposed by 
Weinshall [20], not only is it intricate to log in, but also the 
main claim of resisting shoulder-surfing is proven false [23]. 
In this paper, we introduce a new graphical password scheme 
which provides a good resistance to shoulder-surfing and 
preserves a desirable usability. 
 Our inspiration comes from two representative graphical 
password schemes: DAS [7] and Story [9]. DAS allows users 
to draw a free-form picture on NN ×  grid to produce a 
password [7] and Story requires users to select a sequence of 
images to make a story [9]. Our new shoulder-surfing 
resistant scheme CDS (Come from DAS and Story) adopts a 
similar drawing input method in DAS and inherits the 
association mnemonics in Story for sequence retrieval. It 
requires users to draw a curve across their password images 
(pass-images) orderly rather than click directly on them. The 
drawing method seems to be more compatible with people’s 
writing habit, which may shorten the login time. The 
drawing passes through both pass-images and decoys, which 
used to confuse peepers. To avoid revealing the first and last 
pass-images, the drawing must begin and end with given 
random images. To enhance its shoulder-surfing resistant 
properties further, CDS displays degraded images which are 
difficult to distinguish from a distance or from a side view. 
Moreover, the majority of the drawing trace will be cleared 
away as the stylus being sliding, reducing the probability of 
passwords being revealed. Other complementary measures, 
such as limiting the length of drawing trace, are also 
deployed to strengthen the security.  
We conduct a user study to explore the usability of CDS 
in terms of accuracy, efficiency and memorability, and 
benchmark the usability against that of a Story scheme. The 
result was encouraging that novice users were able to enter 
their passwords accurately and to remember them over time. 
It took about 50 seconds on average to create a password and 
construct a story. In a five-minute test, the mean time to log 
in was 13.7 seconds and one week later all the participants 
could recall their CDS passwords correctly and took 19.8 
seconds on average to log in. In comparison to Story, our 
scheme had a similar memorability, probably due to the 
same association mnemonics. In terms of login time, CDS 
was not as good as Story and the degraded images in CDS 
were most likely to impinge on its efficiency. At the same 
time, there was a remarkable downtrend in the time to log in 
CDS as the number of login increased, indicating that the 
login time will decreases with familiarization. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The 
following section briefly reviews some exemplars of 
graphical password schemes. Section 3 gives a detailed 
introduction to our prototype of CDS. Section 4 presents the 
preliminary experiment and result. Section 5 discusses 
additional observations and possible extension to our scheme. 
Conclusion and future work are addressed in Section 6.  
II. RELATED WORKS 
The trend toward a highly mobile workforce and the 
ubiquity of graphical interfaces (such as the stylus and touch-
screen) has enabled the emergence of graphical 
authentications in PDAs. According to the memory task 
involved in remembering and entering the password, 
graphical passwords can be divided into three general 
categories: recall-based systems, cued-recall systems and 
recognition-based systems [13, 14]. 
DAS is the first recall-based graphical password scheme 
in which the password is a free-form picture drawn on a 2D 
grid [7]. This scheme releases users from remembering 
complex text string and has a large theoretical password 
space. But the drawing rules are difficult to follow, resulting 
in a usability problem. For example, users cannot locate 
strokes too close to a grid-line or cross a corner. To solve 
this issue, Pass-Go (named after an ancient board game Go) 
is proposed which allows users to draw their password using 
grid intersection points instead of grid cells in DAS [15]. 
Another modification to DAS is YAGP [24] where 
approximately correct drawing can be accepted by dividing 
“trend quadrants” and adopting Levenshtein distance string 
matching.  
Cued-recall systems typically require users to remember 
and target specific locations within a presented image. A 
well-known scheme in this category is PassPoints which has 
attracted great attention [10]. In this scheme, users should 
choose several points on an image and click orderly on them 
within a tolerance for authentication. Security analyses find 
it vulnerable to hotspots and simple patterns within images 
[13, 17, 18]. A commercial version of PassPoints for the 
PocketPC is available from visKey for screen-unlock [16]. 
In recognition-based systems, users must recognize the 
target images embedded amongst a set of distractor images. 
Passfaces [25], a representative scheme of this category, is 
based on face recognition and has a high degree of 
memorability [26, 27].  Davis finds that people tended to 
select faces of their own race and gender and presents a 
similar scheme Story which replaces faces with classified 
objects. Story introduces a sequential component to improve 
security and utilizes an association mnemonics for sequence 
retrieval. In specific, users must memorize their images in 
order, aided by constructing a story to connect them.  
A common vulnerability to the above systems is 
shoulder-surfing, a well known method of stealing 
passwords. It occurs when an attacker learns a user’s 
password by watching the user log in. To overcome this 
problem, many shoulder-surfing resistant schemes have been 
devised [11, 19, 20, 28]. In CHC [11], users need to identify 
their pass-objects, visualize the triangle they form and click 
inside the convex hull. Unlike CHC[11], the shoulder-surfing 
resistant graphical scheme proposed by Man, et al [19] 
depends on users remembering several images (pass-objects) 
and the their corresponding text codes as well as coding the 
relative location of the pass-objects in reference to a pair of 
eyes. In the scheme proposed by Weinshall [20], it involves 
remembering a number of images and computing a path 
through a panel of images according to certain rules. 
ColorLogin uses background color to decrease login time 
and resist shoulder-surfing [28]. All of them can provide a 
good protection against shoulder-surfing. However, a user 
study reveals that their inherent drawbacks in usability make 
them less suitable for everyday authentication [13]. 
Motivated by this, we design a new shoulder-surfing 
resistant scheme CDS which is based on recognition and is 
expected to provide a usable security for PDAs by adopting a 
similar drawing inputs method in recall-based systems. 
III. OUR SCHEME 
The proposed shoulder-surfing resistant scheme can be 
considered as an improvement of Story, as it keeps most of 
the advantage of Story and achieves stronger security. Like 
Story, our scheme is based on recognition, an easier memory 
task than recall [21, 22], and suggests users to create a story 
for sequence retrieval. Instead of direct input, it depends on 
users drawing a curve across their password images (pass-
images) in order. The curve containing both pass-images and 
decoys guards against shoulder-surfing attacks by human 
observation. Using a drawing input method, our scheme is 
designed to empower users to log in their mobile devices 
quickly. The following paragraphs describe the design and 
present a prototype. 
     
Figure 1.  The original five pass images. 
     
Figure 2.  The corresponding degraded images. 
Our scheme uses a set of images gathered from 
http://FordModels.com and http://images.google.com. The 
images covering objects, places and people are carefully 
selected to motivate users’ imagination and resized to have 
identical aspect ratios (Figure 1). To create a password, a 
user orderly chooses several images from the set as his/her 
pass-images (Figure 3). The user can remember the 
connection between the pass-images by mentally 
constructing a story. For confirmation, the user should draw 
a curve to cross his/her pass-images in right order without 
lifting the stylus from the drawing surface. With the similar 
interface, the confirmation phase also gives the user a chance 
to familiarize the authentication process. 
During the authentication, a degraded version of the 
images is randomly arranged on the screen. These degraded 
images are formed by increasing brightness and reducing 
contrast of the original images (Figure 2). User must 
recognize his/her degraded pass-images and draw a curve to 
orderly cross them. The curve thus passes through both pass-
images and other random images used to confuse the attacker. 
To avoid revealing pass-images (considering a user usually 
starts with the first pass-image and ends with the last), the 
drawing must begin with a given random image (head image) 
determined by the system and end likewise with another (tail 
image). Moreover, the majority of the drawing trace will be 
cleared away as the stylus being sliding and only the tail part 
will be kept to show the current location of the stylus. 
Without a visual clutter, the user can draw a complicated 
curve to bewilder peepers. At the same time, the trace length 
measured in the number of images crossed is limited within a 
tolerance in view of the random guess and brute force attacks. 
To ensure the legal user logging accurately, the tolerance 
must be greater than the sum of the minimum distance 
between sequential pass-images. The tolerance is adjustable 
and roughly defined by the maximum length of drawing 
trace L  in our prototype.  
 
Figure 3.  Graphical interface during the password creation. 
Figure 3 shows a prototype of our scheme, which uses a 
template of 24 identically sized images, grouped into a 
64×  matrix. In Figure 3, the pass-images labeled by blue 
rectangles are in identical order with that in Figure 1. A 
hidden story may be “a couple and the son want to share a 
cake at their house”. To log in, a user should draw a curve to 
orderly cross the pass-images from the given head image to 
the tail image. A possible drawing to successfully log in the 
scheme is shown in Figure 4 where the head is labeled by red 
rectangle and the tail green.  
 
Figure 4.  A possible drawing trace with length being 19. 
The whole drawing trace is not actually visible and only 
a small tail part, about half the width of an image, will be 
displayed to indicate the current position. In default, the 
maximum length of drawing trace L is defined in terms of 
the number of images in width w and in length l as well as 
the number of pass-images n by: )1()( +⋅+= nlwL . 
Therefore, in Figure 4, 60)15()64( =+×+=L . 
Beyond its shoulder-surfing resistant properties, the 
prototype has a larger password space than that of commonly 
used four-digit alphanumeric PINs and thus more secure. 
IV. USER STUDY 
A. Methodology 
To discuss the usability of CDS, we invited twenty 
university students (10 males and 10 females) to our lab. 
They were in the age range of 20 to 30 and none of them 
were familiar with graphical password schemes. We 
conducted a between-subjects design to benchmark the 
usability against that of Story [9]. So, half of the subjects 
were assigned to the CDS group (using the prototype of CDS) 
and half to the control group (using Story with the identical 
deployment in Figure 3). For both group, each participant 
was required to select five images as his/her pass-images.  
Participants carried out the usability study individually in 
two sessions, an initial session (session 1) and a follow-up 
session (session 2) one week later. 
In the first session, each participant was asked to read an 
instruction document. This provided information of their 
activities on the experiments and helped them know how to 
use Story or CDS. Then both groups orderly chose five 
images as pass-images and created a story to remember them. 
During the following confirmation, people in the CDS group 
checked their passwords and performed a drawing practice 
while the counterparts simply reentered the passwords. After 
a short delay (about 5 minutes), all the participants should 
log in repeatedly until ten successful logins were achieved.  
One week later, at Session 2, all the participants returned 
to the lab and tried to log in with their previously created 
passwords within three attempts.  
For each group, the corresponding scheme was 
instrumented to collect data on the number of correct and 
incorrect logins, the time for each login, and the total time 
for registration. We also recorded the length of drawing trace 
for CDS group when logging in. In addition, the story made 
in the creation was collected through a questionnaire. 
B. Results 
Two types of statistical tests were used to evaluate 
whether differences in the data occurred by conditions or by 
chance. We used t-tests (two tails) to compare the variance 
of the means between two groups and F-tests (one tail) to 
compare the mean login time within a single group. In the 
following, a value of p<0.05 indicates that the test revealed 
statistically significant difference and “not significant” (i.e. 
p>0.05) indicates that the differences were not statistically of 
significance. 
1) Password generation 
Table 1 shows the time to create a password in both 
groups. All the participants could create a password within 2 
minutes correctly, wherein sixteen participants accomplished 
the registration in one minute and the other four participants 
took from 75s to 107s (seconds). We found that there was a 
great difference between the fastest participant and the 
slowest one (16s vs. 107s). It was reported that some people 
found it simple and quick to construct a story while some 
took a long to conceive, indicating that the time differences 
across all participants resulted probably from the inherent 
association ability. The mean time in CDS group was a bit 
longer than that in control group (49.5s vs. 42.9s), but not to 
a statistically significant level. As such, the additional 
familiarization with the drawing in CDS comes at the cost of 
longer time to carry out the registration. 
TABLE I.  PASSWORD GENERATION TIME (SECONDS) IN EACH GROUP. 
Group Avg. t-test S.d. Max Min
CDS 49.5 26.7 107 19 
Story 42.9 
Not 
significant 24.3 93 16 
 
2) Login 
At session 1, all participants achieved the criterion of ten 
correct logins. In CDS group, seven of the participants 
accomplished the criterion in ten attempts with no errors. 
The other three participants made a total of four incorrect 
logins. The mean success login rate is 96.5% (Standard 
Deviation, StdDev=5.98). In control group, eight participants 
made no mistake in ten login attempts and each of the other 
made one incorrect login. The mean success rate is 98.2% 
(StdDev=3.83), higher than that of CDS group. However, it 
is useful to note that in practical terms, this was only a 
difference of two incorrect responses and should be treated 
with caution.  
TABLE II.  LOGIN TIME (SECONDS) FOR ALL CORRECT INPUTS AT 
SESSION 1. 
Group Avg. t-test S.d. Max Min
CDS 13.7 5.97 45 7 
Story 9.2 P<0.01 4.26 32 4 
 
The mean time for correct password inputs was also 
analyzed. As shown in Table 2, the participants in CDS 
group took more time to log in than their counterparts in 
control group on average (13.7s vs. 9.2s). A t-test yields a 
result of t=3.91, p<0.01(two tails), indicating that there was 
statistically significant difference between two conditions. 
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Figure 5.  A possible drawing trace with length being 19. 
Figure 5 shows the mean times for input of ten correct 
passwords in both groups. We can see that both groups kept 
a downward trend in time to input the password and the trend 
in CDS group looked more salient. Moreover, the difference 
between two groups became more and more slight. For CDS 
group, an F-test (one tail) yields a result of F=4.11, p<0.01, 
showing a significant decrease in time to input the password 
over the ten logins. For the control group, the result of F-test 
(one tail) indicated that there were no significant differences 
over the ten logins. It can be concluded that users will 
become adroit at CDS with frequent use. 
TABLE III.  LOGIN TIME (SECONDS) AT SESSION 2. 
Group Avg. t-test S.d. Max Min
CDS 19.8 11.7 48 5 
Story 23.1 
Not 
significant 16.2 60 7 
 
One week later, 19 participants were able to correctly 
recall their passwords and one participant could identify all 
of his pass-images but forgot the order. 80% of the CDS 
group and 60% of the control group could log in successfully 
with one attempt. The remainder of the CDS group 
succeeded in two attempts while one participant in the 
control group failed and the others succeeded within three 
attempts. It appears that the CDS group performed better 
than the control group in the long-term recall.  
With the superiority in recall rate, the CDS group had an 
advantage over the control group in the mean time to log in 
(19.8s vs. 23.1s). Table 3 shows the results which were the 
total time to log in with three chances instead of a single 
correct attempt in Table 2. It should be noted that the control 
group (13.5s, StdDev=5.65) was still faster than the CDS 
group (15.25s, StdDev=5.31) when only evaluating mean 
time of the successful login in one attempt. 
V. DISCUSSION 
A. Login time 
It took 13.7 seconds to log in our scheme on average, an 
advantage over other shoulder-surfing resistant schemes [11, 
19, 20]. Through the identical association mnemonics, CDS 
has a similar memorability in comparison to Story. However, 
CDS was not as good as Story in respect of login time. We 
took a closer look at this issue and found that the offset arose 
probably from two aspects. 
On the one hand, the degrade images in the prototype of 
CDS seemed to impinge on the high efficiency to log in. As 
reported by some participants, it took more efforts for users 
to find out a degraded image with less color contrast. The 
random head and tail images used to protect the first and last 
pass-images also had a negative influence on the usability. 
For example, at the initial stage, participants were prone to 
forget starting with the head and ending with the tail, so they 
must redraw a curve. It was worthwhile to note that this 
phenomenon faded away as the number of login increased, 
consistent with the downward trend in Figure 3.   
 On the other hand, we used a PC to simulate the 
performance of our prototype in PDAs and thus participants 
had to use a mouse instead of a stylus for input. As known, 
mouse-clicking was much more convenient than dragging, 
especially for users unfamiliar with mouse operation. A 
quick dragging was more likely to go beyond the input area 
than a clicking and some participants in CDS group did 
occasionally draw outside, never occurring in the control 
group. Furthermore, things would be different when the 
PDAs with a stylus were usable. Unlike the mouse, a stylus 
was easier to operate and the drawing method appeared to be 
more compatible with people’s writing habit. Then, it was 
unlikely to draw beyond the input area and should be more 
comfortable to log in CDS quickly. However, we should 
conduct another experiment to check this conclusion. 
B. User behavior 
From the viewpoint of security, the risks of CDS come 
largely from insecure user behavior. First, some participants 
tended to move the mouse to the first pass-image instead of 
the random head image. So the first pass-image was easily to 
be cracked. Second, we found that most of the participants 
kept the mouse on a pass-image for a second before dragging 
it to another. Final, hotspot was still a serious security 
problem. Figure 4 shows the most popular images selected 
by 11, 9 and 8 participants respectively. Figure 5 shows the 
least popular images over all participants. Each was selected 
only by one participant. It appeared that images in Figure 4 
were easy to spur an association while the images in Figure 5 
are hard. Therefore, the image set was of great importance 
and should be redesigned with more care. 
C. Drawing trace and image distribution 
The tolerance of the drawing trace and the location of the 
pass-images, affected both the usability and security. A 
proper tolerance was necessary to prevent efficiently against 
random attempt and ensure the legal user logging accurately. 
In our experiment, it appeared that the default tolerance (60) 
was friendly for participants to pass the authentication since 
none of them exceeded the range. The mean length of 
drawing trace in authentication was 23.7 (StdDev=5.98) and 
range was from 14 to 40, indicating that the given tolerance 
of the trace length could be narrowed to enhance the security 
without impairing the usability. Instead of the accuracy, the 
location of the pass-images was closely related with login 
time. It took shorter to find pass-images when they were 
close to each other, similar to the finding in literature [11]. 
But, with a small portion of the window, the drawing would 
cross more pass-images and fewer random images, resulting 
in the pass-images easily being cracked. In addition, the 
distribution of the pass-images in location restricted the 
minimum of the trace length. A centered distribution 
correlated with a shorter length while a scatter with a longer 
length, a general phenomenon in our experiment. This 
revealed that it was better to set a relative tolerance than an 
absolute maximum length of drawing trace. 
D. Other 
We found the CDS group was more likely to use a story 
CDS during the one-week recall, which was not consistent 
with the finding by Davis, et al [9]. This may be caused by 
the drawing practice, our experiment requirements or by 
chance. A wide user study is necessary to illustrate it in 
depth. In addition, our scheme can be adjusted to adapt to 
different security demands and application situations. For 
example, the input can be implemented by drawing several 
strokes in order rather than a single curve. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a new shoulder-surfing resistant scheme 
CDS was proposed. It adopts a visual login technique that 
matches the capabilities and limitations of most handheld 
devices and provides a simple and intuitive way for users to 
authenticate. As such, it is an example of “usable security”. 
The main contribution is that it overcomes a drawback of 
recall-based systems by erasing the drawing trace and 
introduces the drawing method to a variant of Story to resist 
shoulder-surfing. Usability testing of the CDS scheme 
showed that users were able to enter their passwords 
accurately and to remember them over time. In the first ten 
successful login, it took participants about 13.7 seconds to 
log in CDS at average and there was a gentle downward 
trend in time to input the password. One week later, all the 
participants recalled their CDS passwords correctly and 
spent approximately 19.8 seconds recalling and logging in.  
Further work includes redesigning the image set, finding 
a proper tolerance for the drawing trace length, reducing the 
login time as well as conducting another user study where 
users are required to log in PDAs equipped with a stylus 
instead of a simulation on PCs. We also plan to investigate 
the entropy issue of pass-images and to study in more depth 
the effect of the association mnemonics on graphical 
passwords. 
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